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
# DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4/4

## PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

(14 December 1954; SECRET)

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, paragraph 2, the following list of priority national intelligence objectives is established as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national security policy.

2. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be critical national intelligence factors requiring priority attention and effort. Distinction is made, however, between three levels of priority within the general priority category. Order of listing within these three groups is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within the group.



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3. In order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planning, this directive is designed to remain valid over an extended period. It will be reviewed semiannually, or on the request of any member of the IAC. It is recognized that urgent interim requirements may arise requiring ad hoc treatment, and that the criteria on which the following priorities are established shall remain under continuing review.

4. DCID 4/2 is hereby rescinded.\*

**I. HIGHEST PRIORITY OBJECTIVES:** Those of such critical importance as to require a maximum intelligence effort.

a. Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans, particularly Soviet intentions and plans to initiate hostilities using Soviet or Satellite armed forces.

b. Chinese Communist over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans, particularly Chinese Communist intentions and plans to initiate hostilities using Chinese Communist armed forces

c. Soviet development, production, disposition, and employment of weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite for nuclear attack on the United States and or key US overseas installations or for defense of the Soviet Bloc against air attack. Particular reference is made to the development, production, and employment of: (1) nuclear weapons, (2) delivery systems, including aircraft, guided missiles and related base facilities, and (3) the components of the Soviet air defense systems

d. Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandestine delivery of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons

**II. HIGH PRIORITY OBJECTIVES:** Those of such high importance as to warrant an intensive intelligence effort.

**The USSR and European Satellites**

a. The Soviet estimate of US and allied capabilities and intentions, of US and allied economic and political stability, and of the strength, cohesion, and probable development of the NATO Bloc

b. Major Soviet international political objectives and courses of action, including economic policies and actions, with particular reference to courses designed to weaken and disrupt the NATO alliance or to foment antagonism between Western and Asian powers

c. Soviet political strengths and weaknesses, the actual locus of political power in the USSR, actual or potential personal or policy conflicts within the ruling group, Soviet Satellite relations, with particular reference to the character and degree of Soviet control; the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite apparatus of police control, the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the Soviet and Satellite populations

\* DCID 4/2, "Priority List of Critical National Intelligence Objectives," was issued 28 September 1950 and revised 12 June 1952 and 4 August 1953

**NOTE** Order of listing within Category I is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within that category

d. The character of the Soviet (including Satellite) economy, with particular reference to its ability to support a major war; the motivation, character, and magnitude of current economic development programs, their implementation, and their effect upon the economic, political, and military strength of the Soviet Bloc.

e. Soviet and Satellite scientific and technical strengths and weaknesses affecting Soviet economic and military capabilities.

f. The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite armed forces, including their strategic and tactical doctrine, their political reliability, their logistical support, and military production and stockpiling.

**The Far East (including Southeast Asia)**

g. The Chinese Communist estimate of US capabilities and intentions with respect to the Chinese Communist regime and to the situation in the Far East.

h. Major Chinese Communist international political objectives and courses of action, with particular reference to courses designed to foment antagonism between Western and Asian powers and to extend the area of Communist influence and control in Asia.

i. The internal political strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist regime, actual or potential personal or policy conflicts within the ruling group, the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist apparatus of police control, the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the population of mainland China.

j. Sino-Soviet relations, with particular reference to the degree of Soviet influence or control, the extent of Chinese Communist freedom of action, and actual or potential strains on the relationship.

k. The strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist economy, plans for its development, and progress therein, scientific and technological strengths and weaknesses affecting economic and military capabilities, the capabilities and vulnerabilities of Chinese Communist internal communications and communications with the USSR.

l. The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist armed forces, including their strategic and tactical doctrine, their political reliability, and their logistical support.

m. The political and economic strengths and weaknesses of the North Korean regime, and the relative degree of Soviet and Chinese Communist influence or control in North Korea.

n. The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of the North Korean armed forces, including their political reliability and their logistical support.

o. The political and economic strengths and weaknesses of the Viet Minh regime, the nature of its political relationships with the USSR and with Communist China, and its political and military objectives.

NOTE. Order of listing within Category II is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within that category.

p. The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of the Viet Minh armed forces, including the nature and amount of the military aid received from Communist China and the USSR.

q. The political, economic, and military strengths and weaknesses of non-Communist regimes in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

r. The reactions of the governments and peoples of South and Southeast Asia to developments in Indochina and to the general threat of further Communist aggrandizement in the region; Communist political and subversive capabilities in those countries.

## Western Europe

power of nuclear weapons and to increasing Soviet nuclear war capabilities, the effect of such reactions on the coherence and effectiveness of the NATO alliance.

u. The extent of French support for and opposition to the rearmament of West Germany in association with the West; French susceptibility to Soviet proposals for the neutralization of Germany; effectiveness of French implementation of the London agreements.

## General

w. The strength, composition, interrelationships, capabilities (political, subversive, and clandestine), and vulnerabilities of major Communist parties outside the Soviet Bloc and of international Communist front organizations, particularly the political and paramilitary capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Communist parties in France and Italy; trends in global and local Communist party tactics.

III. LOWER PRIORITY OBJECTIVES: Those of sufficient importance to warrant priority in relation to normal coverage.

## South Asia, the Near East, and Africa

a. The policy of the Indian Government, with particular reference to its position in the global balance of power, its relations with Communist China and the USSR, and its attitude toward developments in Southeast Asia.

b. The stability of the Government of Iran, with particular reference to Tudeh strength and capabilities.

NOTE: Order of listing within Category II is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within that category.

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[REDACTED]

d. The stability and policy of the Egyptian Government, with particular reference to developments relating to Middle East defense plans, the Suez base, and the Sudan.

e. Nationalist unrest in French North Africa and Communist connections therewith.

#### Europe

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f. The stability and policy of the Governments of France [REDACTED] and Italy, the general trend of popular opinion in those countries, and the trend in parliamentary politics.

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g. The stability and orientation of the Yugoslav Government, its strategic intentions in the event of war, and the strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of its armed forces.

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#### Latin America

i. The development of militant nationalism in Latin America and Communist exploitation of this trend.

#### General

j. Economic conditions and trends in backward countries, particularly as they affect vulnerabilities to Communist propaganda on the one hand and attitudes toward the United States and the West on the other.

k. Non-Soviet nuclear energy research and development, the production of fissionable materials and the use of such materials for weapons or other purposes.

ALLEN W. DULLES

Director of Central Intelligence

NOTE: Order of listing within Category III is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within that category.

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